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Companies can create value by differentiating their products and services along
quantitative attributes. Existing research suggests that consumers’ tendency to
rely on relatively effortless and affect-based processes reduces their sensitivity to
the scope of quantitative attributes and that this explains why increments along
quantitative attributes often have diminishing marginal value. The current article
sheds new light on how “system 1” processes moderate the effect of quantitative
product attributes on subjective value. Seven studies provide evidence that sys-
tem 1 processes can produce diminishing marginal value, but also increasing mar-
ginal value, or any combination of the two, depending on the composition of the
choice set. This is because system 1 processes facilitate ordinal comparisons
(e.g., 256 GB is more than 128 GB, which is more than 64 GB) while system 2 pro-
cesses, which are relatively more effortful and calculation based, facilitate cardinal
comparisons (e.g., the difference between 256 and 128 GB is twice as large as
between 128 and 64 GB).
Keywords: product differentiation, scope sensitivity, diminishing marginal value,
dual-process theory, range–frequency theory, numerical cognition
INTRODUCTION
To fit the needs of different customer segments and tosustain a competitive advantage in today’s market-
place, companies offer multiple versions of their products
or services. Such differentiation frequently happens along
quantitative dimensions. For instance, tablet computers can
differ in terms of storage capacity, screen size, or weight
and annuities can differ in terms of starting monthly in-
come, annual increases in payment, or period-certain guar-
antees. For marketers, it is important to anticipate how
consumers will respond to quantitative product differentia-
tion. Imagine a supplier of frontload washing machines
currently sells two models: one with a capacity of 4.5 cubic
feet and another with a capacity of 5.2 cubic feet. Their in-
novation team of engineers and marketers is contemplating
whether the company should add a third model with an
even greater capacity of 5.5 cubic feet to its product line.
The team wonders how much more consumers might be
willing to pay for this extra capacity? Would consumers’
willingness to pay for extra capacity be higher or lower if
the washing machines also varied along other attributes,
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such as the number of spin cycles, or whether they are
equipped with VRT Plus Technology to reduce vibration?
Might these additional product specifications burden con-
sumers’ cognitive resources and alter their willingness to
pay for extra capacity? Would it matter whether the alter-
natives are presented to consumers as “small,” “medium,”
and “large”?
Common marketing wisdom suggests that there are
diminishing returns to product improvements. For instance,
consumers may see greater value in a laptop with 6 hours
of battery life compared to one with 4 hours (þ2 hours),
but the difference between a laptop with 16 hours of battery
life and one with 14 hours (also þ2 hours) may not be per-
ceived as particularly valuable. In other words, the value of
a unit increase in the attribute decreases with the units of
the attribute offered already and sellers need to establish
larger and larger increments to create equivalent increases
in perceived value. Research in psychology and marketing
suggests that consumers’ tendency to rely on relatively ef-
fortless and affect-based information processing (i.e.,
“system 1” processing) reduces their sensitivity to the
scope of quantitative attributes and that this explains why
increments along quantitative attributes often have dimin-
ishing marginal value (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004; Hsee,
Rottenstreich, and Xiao 2005; Mukherjee 2010; Patalano
et al. 2015; Schley and Peters 2014). The insight that there
is a relationship between System 1 processes and diminish-
ing marginal value has been influential in
marketing (Hossain and Saini 2015; Huang and Gong
2018; Huang, Huang, and Jiang 2018; Kull and Heath
2016; Lee et al. 2019; Liu et al. 2015; Saini and Thota
2010).
While the expectation of diminishing marginal value,
and the notion that it is rooted in system 1 processing, has
intuitive appeal, the current article reveals that the relation-
ship between system 1 processing and subjective value is
more nuanced. First, we will show that a unit increase in an
attribute can in fact have a larger impact on subjective
value when it occurs at the high end of a quantitative attrib-
ute than when it occurs at the low end; that is, a pattern of
increasing marginal value. It can also happen that a unit in-
crease in an attribute has a smaller impact on subjective
value when it occurs at the low end or at the high end of a
quantitative attribute than when it occurs in the middle of
the range; that is, a pattern of increasing-then-decreasing
marginal value. Or the opposite, that a unit increase in an
attribute has a larger impact on subjective value when it
occurs at the low end or at the high end of a quantitative at-
tribute than when it occurs in the middle of the range; that
is, a pattern of decreasing-then-increasing marginal value.
These results may appear counterintuitive, or atypical, but
we will show that in fact they occur under normal condi-
tions, for instance, when consumers assess the value of
products presented side by side.
Second, we will trace these curvatures in the value func-
tion to different ways in which the mind can process quan-
titative information. Quantitative specifications can be
compared in an ordinal way (e.g., coffee size A is larger
than B, which is larger than C) or in a cardinal way (e.g.,
coffee size A is 8 ounces larger than B, which is 2 ounces
larger than C). We argue that ordinal comparisons produce
curvature in value functions, while cardinal comparisons
produce linearity. Consistent with this, we show that prod-
uct labels emphasizing the ordinal positions of attribute
levels (e.g., “small,” “medium,” and “large”) can amplify
the extent of diminishing and increasing marginal value.
Third, we argue that system 1 processes facilitate ordinal
comparisons while system 2 processes facilitate cardinal
comparisons. In line with this, we show that curvature in
value functions is amplified when judgments are made un-
der time pressure, or when information about additional
attributes burdens cognitive resources. On the other hand,
we show that curvature in value functions is attenuated
amongst consumers that score higher on the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT), or when ordinal cues are less
accurate.
The broad conclusion from our work is that system 1
processing is not uniquely associated with diminishing
marginal value. Instead, system 1 has a penchant for mak-
ing ordinal comparisons; this can produce diminishing
marginal value, increasing marginal value, or any combi-
nation of the two, depending on the composition of the
choice set. This insight has immediate implications for
practitioners responsible for engineering product
portfolios.
SYSTEM 1 PROCESSES AND
DIMINISHING MARGINAL VALUE
Today’s shopping environments are complex and clut-
tered, but consumers have only limited cognitive resources,
so they cannot elaborate on all information to the same ex-
tent. To make satisfactory judgments, consumers recruit
both system 1 and system 2 processes (Evans and
Stanovich 2013; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Sloman
1996). System 1 processes can handle large chunks of in-
formation and produce “quick-and-dirty” assessments of
alternatives, often inspired by affect. System 2 processes,
instead, are calculative and rule based. They require more
cognitive resources and take more time to produce a re-
sponse. System 2 processes are therefore engaged only se-
lectively, to elaborate on information that has the potential
to significantly increase decision quality, and only when
sufficient cognitive resources are available (Chaiken and
Trope 1999; Kahneman and Frederick 2002; Sloman
1996).
System 1 processes can be related to diminishing mar-
ginal value in at least two ways. First, there is a
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relationship between effort and diminishing marginal
value. Studies on numerical cognition have shown that it
requires more cognitive effort to discriminate between two
large quantities (e.g., 110 vs. 105) than to discriminate be-
tween two small quantities (e.g., 10 vs. 5; Parkman 1971).
This “size effect” occurs regardless of whether people are
presented with different numbers of objects, with Arabic
digits, or number words (for a review see Dehaene 2011).
When people are deprived of cognitive resources, their
ability to discriminate between larger quantities deterio-
rates (Anobile, Cicchini, and Burr 2012) and a reduced
ability to discriminate between large quantities is related to
diminishing marginal value (Schley and Peters 2014).
Thus, consumers may perceive an increase in apartment
size from 2,000 to 2,200 square feet as less valuable than
an increase in apartment size from 1,000 to 1,200 square
feet, because it is more difficult to discriminate between
2,000 and 2,200 than between 1,000 and 1,200.
Second, there is a relationship between affect and dimin-
ishing marginal value. In a series of articles, Hsee and
Rottenstreich (2004), Hsee et al. (2005), and Hsee and
Zhang (2010) proposed that affect-based evaluations are
determined by the presence versus absence of attributes
(e.g., whether a spa package includes a massage), but not
by further variations in scope (e.g., whether the duration of
a massage is 60 or 90 minutes). In a seminal study, Hsee
and Rottenstreich (2004) asked participants how much they
were willing to pay for five or ten Madonna CDs, either af-
ter reporting how they felt about a number of emotionally
charged topics (i.e., an affect-prime aimed to induce sys-
tem 1 processing) or after solving a few numerical prob-
lems (i.e., a calculation prime aimed to induce system 2
processing). The number of CDs had a smaller effect on
willingness to pay in the affect-prime condition than in the
calculation-prime condition. Several other studies have
conceptually replicated this result using different stimuli,
manipulations, and dependent measures (Chang and Pham
2018; Dickert et al. 2015; Dunn and Ashton-James 2008;
Hasford, Farmer, and Waites 2015; Peters et al. 2012;
Pham and Avnet 2009; Pham et al. 2015). The relationship
between system 1 processes and diminishing marginal
value is made explicit in the mathematical formalization
presented by Mukherjee (2010).
Importantly, studies in this literature do not directly ex-
amine curvature in individual-level value functions.
Participants typically evaluate one of the two alternatives:
one with a lower attribute level (e.g., 5 CDs) and one with
a higher attribute level (e.g., 10 CDs). Judgments are thus
made in “separate evaluation mode” and the shape of the
value function is inferred by averaging the perceived value
of the low versus high attribute level across participants,
assuming a zero point. Yet, consumers oftentimes compare
three or more alternatives before buying. Research on how
the mind processes numerical information hints that, in
fact, the relationship between system 1 processes and sub-
jective value may be more nuanced under these conditions.
SENSITIVITY TO ORDINAL RANK AND
SUBJECTIVE VALUE
Quantitative product specifications provide information
about both ordinal rank and cardinal distance. Imagine a
consumer learns that three tablet computers have storage
capacities of 64, 128, and 256 GB. That tells her that the
first model has less storage than the second, and the second
model less than the third. These are ordinal distinctions,
and they provide one potential input for decision-making.
It also tells her that the difference in storage between the
second and third models is two times larger than the differ-
ence in storage between the first and second models. These
are cardinal distinctions, which provide another input for
decision-making.
Our perception of magnitude is a function of both cardi-
nal and ordinal comparisons. This was first recognized by
range–frequency theory (Parducci 1963, 1965), and it has
since shaped our understanding of how consumers interpret
prices (Cunha and Shulman 2011; Niedrich, Sharma, and
Wedell 2001; Niedrich et al. 2009), make choices (Cooke
et al. 2004; Wernerfelt 1995), and respond on rating scales
(Janiszewski, Silk, and Cooke 2003; Lynch, Chakravarti,
and Mitra 1991). In range–frequency theory, the psycho-
logical intensity of a stimulus depends on the distribution
of other stimuli that are available in the immediate envi-
ronment. Specifically, it depends on the proportional dis-
tance of the focal stimulus to the least versus the most
intense available stimuli (this is the range principle) and
the proportion of stimuli that are less intense than the focal
stimulus (this is the frequency principle). For instance, the
way consumers perceive a tablet with 128 GB of storage
capacity depends on the storage capacities of other tablets
available in the immediate environment. If there are two
other tablets, of 64 and 256 GB, a 128 GB tablet will ap-
pear relatively small according to the range principle (be-
cause it is only 33% of the way between the smallest and
largest sizes), but average according to the frequency prin-
ciple (because 50% of the other tablets are smaller). The
subjective size of the 128 GB tablet is a weighted average
of these two comparisons.
If subjective value is determined exclusively by cardinal
distance (i.e., the range principle), increments along quan-
titative attributes would have constant marginal value.
Sensitivity to ordinal rank (i.e., the frequency principle),
however, introduces curvature in subjective value func-
tions. To see how, assume for a moment that judgments are
determined exclusively by ordinal rank. The change from
64 to 128 GB produces the same increase in ordinal rank
(from third to second), and thus value, as the change from
128 to 256 GB (from second to first). Because the two
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options at the low end differ only by 64 GB while the two
options at the high end differ by 128 GB, changes in the at-
tribute have diminishing marginal value. Now, suppose the
tablet models had storage capacities of 64, 192, and 256
GB. Mere sensitivity to rank now produces a pattern of in-
creasing marginal value. Increasing ordinal rank from third
to second requires 128 additional GB, but only 64 addi-
tional GB are needed to further increase ordinal rank from
second to first. Following the same logic, it can also hap-
pen that a unit increase in an attribute has a smaller impact
on subjective value when it occurs at the low end or at the
high end of a quantitative attribute than when it occurs in
the middle of the range; that is, an S-shaped value function
(e.g., for five models with storage capacities of 64, 144,
160, 176, and 256 GB). Or the opposite, that a unit increase
in an attribute has a larger impact on subjective value when
it occurs at the low end or at the high end of a quantitative
attribute than when it occurs in the middle of the range;
that is, an inverse S-shaped value function (e.g., for five
models with storage capacities of 64, 80, 160, 240, and 256
GB).
SYSTEM 1 PROCESSES AND
SENSITIVITY TO ORDINAL RANK
System 1 processes are relatively effortless and continu-
ously running, whereas system 2 processes are more effort-
ful and must be switched on to regulate the influence of
system 1 processes. If system 2 processes do not take over,
system 1 processes will determine judgments and decisions
(Evans and Stanovich 2013; Kahneman and Frederick
2002). Similarly, we argue that there is a hierarchical rela-
tionship between ordinal and cardinal comparisons. System
1 continuously makes ordinal comparisons that approxi-
mate the cardinal distance between alternatives, but system
2 is required to accurately interpret cardinal distance. Thus,
if system 2 is not engaged to calculate cardinal distance,
subjective value is determined by system 1 and ordinal
comparisons.
We base this argument on research in numerical cogni-
tion. Rhesus monkeys, cotton-top tamarins, and even rats
are able to tell whether one quantity is larger than another
(Brannon and Terrace 1998; Hauser et al. 2003), suggest-
ing that ordinal comparisons are relatively easy to make
and that this ability is rooted in an evolutionarily ancient
neural mechanism (Dehaene et al. 2003; Pinel et al. 2004).
Human infants as young as 6 months can recognize that a
set of 10 dots is more numerous than a set of 5 dots, despite
having no concept of the cardinal quantities “10” and “5”
(Xu and Spelke 2000). This ability plays an important role
in the further development of their numerical cognition
(Brannon 2002; Lipton and Spelke 2003; Wynn 1990; Xu
2003). Children must first understand the rank order of a
number within the number system before they can learn
the number’s cardinal quantity. For instance, to learn what
the number “five” means, we must first understand that
“two” is greater than “one,” “three” is greater than “two,”
“four” is greater than “three,” and that “five” is greater
than “four.” Thus, our ability to understand ordinal rela-
tionships is closely related to our understanding and assess-
ment of cardinal quantity. Accurately computing the
cardinal distance between two quantities adds another layer
of complexity, and this ability is typically acquired at a
later age through formal training (Schley and Peters 2014;
Siegler and Opfer 2003). Thus, processing quantitative in-
formation at the cardinal level requires more cognitive
resources than processing it at the ordinal level, suggesting
an association between system 1 and ordinal comparisons.
In addition, affect has been associated with ordinal eval-
uations. Pham et al. (2015) asked consumers to evaluate
different types of food in terms of taste and ease of prepa-
ration. Taste was pretested to be affect-rich and thus more
likely to engage system 1 processing, while ease of prepa-
ration was pretested to be affect-poor and thus more likely
to engage system 2 processing. Participants were asked if
they wanted to rank the various food options or instead rate
all options on a 7-point scale. They preferred to rank the
options when evaluating taste but rate the options when
evaluating ease of preparation, suggesting a congruence
between affect and ordinal comparisons. Pham et al.
(2015) argued that the association between affect and ordi-
nal comparisons explains why affect-based evaluations are
insensitive to scope (see above), but again, this conclusion
is based solely on studies that include only two levels of a
given attribute and an assumed origin point.
INTERMEDIATE SUMMARY AND
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
In sum, the current article integrates two previously
unconnected literatures. From the first literature, on dual-
process models of subjective value, we take that value
judgments result from an interplay between system 1 and
system 2 processes. While we agree that the curvature of
subjective value functions changes with the relative influ-
ence of system 1 processes, we disagree that system 1 pro-
cesses reduce sensitivity to scope and exclusively produce
diminishing marginal value. From the second literature, on
range–frequency theory, we take the idea that the percep-
tion of attribute levels is a function of both ordinal and car-
dinal comparisons and that ordinal comparisons can
produce curvature in the mapping of objective stimuli on
subjective evaluations. We add to this literature that there
is a hierarchical relationship between ordinal and cardinal
comparisons, such that system 1 processes facilitate ordinal
comparisons while system 2 processes facilitate cardinal
comparisons.
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We test this new dual-process account of subjective
value in 10 studies. Seven studies are presented below, and
three more studies are included in a web appendix.
The studies measure subjective value in different ways
(e.g., willingness to pay, choice, and perceived quality rat-
ings) across a wide range of product categories (e.g., pizzas,
charities, and apartments). They measure and manipulate
reliance on system 1 versus system 2 processing in a variety
of ways (e.g., the CRT, time pressure, and information
load) and demonstrate effects in both hypothetical and con-
sequential settings, in different populations (US-based
respondents recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk,
UK-based respondents recruited through Prolific, and un-
dergraduate students participating in a lab study).
STUDY 1
Existing dual-process models of subjective value can ac-
count for diminishing and constant marginal value, but
they do not allow for any other pattern of marginal value.
The primary goal of study 1 is to demonstrate that marginal
value, in fact, can also be increasing.
We present consumers with three alternatives that vary
along one attribute and manipulate the cardinal distance
between attribute levels by varying the intermediate level,
holding the extreme levels constant. We expect to find
diminishing marginal value if the intermediate attribute
level is closest to the inferior attribute level (which we call
accelerated spacing; e.g., 10–12–18), but increasing mar-
ginal value if the intermediate attribute level is closest to
the superior attribute level (which we call decelerated spac-
ing; e.g., 10–16–18). When the intermediate attribute level
is equally close to the inferior and superior attribute levels
(which we call uniform spacing; e.g., 10–14–18), we do
not expect to find systematic deviations from constant mar-
ginal value. In the web appendix, we describe a conceptual
replication of study 1 (study S1) where we manipulate the
spacing of attribute levels differently, by varying the ex-
treme levels across conditions, holding the intermediate
level constant. This study reveals similar effects of attrib-
ute spacing on subjective value.
Another goal of study 1 is to provide evidence that ordi-
nal comparisons underlie the differences in curvature de-
scribed above. Marketers often use size labels (e.g.,
“small,” “medium,” and “large”) to influence consumer
search and decision-making (Aydinoglu and Krishna
2011). Such labels highlight the ordinal positions of alter-
natives in a choice set. If ordinal information processing
explains why value functions are concave when attribute
levels are spaced in an accelerated way and convex when
spaced in a decelerated way, we should find that these pat-
terns are more pronounced when ordinal labels are added
to alternatives.
Method
Five hundred thirty-eight respondents from Amazon
Mechanical Turk participated in the study for a small mon-
etary reward (192 females, Mage ¼ 30.17, SD ¼ 9.92). The
study used a 3 (attribute spacing: accelerated vs. uniform
vs. decelerated)  2 (ordinal labels: no vs. yes) between-
participant experimental design. We asked participants to
indicate how much they were willing to pay for three dif-
ferent pizza sizes, spaced either in an accelerated manner
(10–12–18 inches), a uniform manner (10–14–18 inches),
or a decelerated manner (10–16–18 inches). About a third
of participants saw the three pizza sizes without ordinal
labels (e.g., 10 vs. 12 vs. 18 inches). For the other partici-
pants, we highlighted the ordinal rank of the different sizes,
either with numeric labels (e.g., Option 1: 10 inches vs.
Option 2: 12 inches vs. Option 3: 18 inches) or with verbal
labels (e.g., small: 10 inches vs. medium: 12 inches vs.
large: 18 inches). Results were similar for numeric and ver-
bal labels, so we do not distinguish between the two types.
All participants provided one willingness-to-pay judg-
ment for each size, so three dollar amounts in total. We
want to examine how changes in attribute levels translate
into subjective value at the individual level, but differences
between participants in terms of their average willingness
to pay for the three sizes may obscure differences within
participants. To illustrate, suppose there are four partici-
pants in the condition with uniform spacing (i.e., 10–14–18
inches) providing the following dollar amounts: $1–$4–$5,
$3–$8–$9, $10–$15–$18, and $20–$25–$50. Although
willingness to pay is consistent with diminishing marginal
value for three out of four participants, the average willing-
ness to pay across participants for the three pizza sizes is
$8.5–$13–$20.5, suggesting increasing marginal value.
This is because the fourth participant provided higher dol-
lar amounts. To account for this heterogeneity in absolute
willingness to pay, we transformed each participant’s judg-
ments to a scale from 0 to 1 using the following formula:
RV¼ (AVAVinferior)/(AVsuperiorAVinferior), where RV
stands for relative value and AV stands for absolute value.
For example, willingness to pay of $10–$14–$20 would be
rescaled to 0–0.40–1, reflecting that willingness to pay for
the intermediate size was 40% of the way between the
small and large sizes. We applied the same procedure for
the attribute levels such that, for instance, 10–12–18 inches
were rescaled to 0–0.25–1. In the web appendix, we report
absolute value judgments by attribute level for all condi-
tions in all studies.
Before applying this rescaling procedure, we excluded
data from participants who provided non-monotonic
responses. We required strict monotonicity between the in-
ferior and superior options (i.e., inferior value < superior
value) and weak monotonicity for all intermediate options
relative to the inferior and superior options (i.e., inferior
value  intermediate value, intermediate value  superior
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value). For instance, a participant with a willingness to pay
of $10 for a 10 inch pizza, $8 for a 12 inch pizza, and $20
for a 20 inch pizza would be excluded, but a participant
with a willingness to pay $10 for a 10 inch pizza, $10 for a
12 inch pizza, and $20 for a 20 inch pizza would not be ex-
cluded. We applied the same criteria in all studies. In the
current study, these criteria led us to exclude data from
four participants. Conclusions across studies are qualita-
tively similar without these exclusions.
Results
Figure 1 presents relative willingness to pay as a func-
tion of relative attribute levels. As can be seen from the
graph, subjective value is a concave function of attribute
levels when the spacing between attribute levels is acceler-
ated (dashed lines), implying diminishing marginal value.
It is a linear function of attribute levels when the spacing
between attribute levels is uniform (solid lines), implying
constant marginal value. Crucially, it is a convex function
of attribute levels when the spacing between attribute lev-
els is decelerated (dotted lines), implying increasing mar-
ginal value. Moreover, the extent of diminishing and
increasing marginal value appears more pronounced when
ordinal labels are present (triangles) versus not (circles).
To examine the statistical significance of these patterns,
we compared relative willingness to pay with relative at-
tribute levels. Because relative willingness to pay and at-
tribute levels for the extreme sizes were 0 and 1 for all
participants, statistical analyses are based on judgments for
the intermediate size. When attribute levels were spaced in
an accelerated manner, relative willingness to pay for the
intermediate size amongst participants who did not see or-
dinal labels was 0.37 (SD ¼ 0.11, CI95 ¼ [0.35, 0.40]).
This implies that willingness to pay for the intermediate
size was 37% of the way between willingness to pay for
the small size and willingness to pay for the large size.
This is significantly higher than the relative attribute level
of the intermediate size, which was 0.25 by design (t(68) ¼
9.12, p < .001, d¼ 2.21). Thus, increasing the attribute by
25% of the attribute range increases subjective value by
37% of the subjective value range, implying diminishing
marginal value. Moreover, relative willingness to pay
amongst participants who did not see ordinal labels was
lower compared to those who did see ordinal labels (M ¼
0.41, SD ¼ 0.13, CI95 ¼ [0.39, 0.43], t(208) ¼ 2.12, p ¼
.03, d¼ 0.29).
When attribute levels were spaced in a decelerated man-
ner, relative willingness to pay for the intermediate size
amongst participants who did not see ordinal labels was
0.59 (SD ¼ 0.13, CI95 ¼ [0.56, 0.62]). This is significantly
lower than the relative attribute level of the intermediate
size, which was 0.75 by design (t(69) ¼ 10.26, p < .001,
d¼ 2.47), implying increasing marginal value. Moreover,
relative willingness to pay amongst participants who did
not see ordinal labels was higher compared to those who
did see ordinal labels (M¼ 0.52, SD ¼ 0.12, CI95 ¼ [0.50,
0.54], t(205) ¼ 3.66, p < .001, d¼ 0.51).
The pattern of results described so far is consistent with
our claim that ordinal comparisons can increase curvature
in subjective value functions, but ordinal comparisons need
not always produce curvature. When attribute levels were
spaced in a uniform way, ordinal and cardinal comparisons
provide the same information–that the intermediate option
lies halfway between the inferior and superior options.
Thus, increasing the relative influence of ordinal versus
cardinal comparisons should bear no systematic effect on
judgments. In line with this, we find no difference in rela-
tive willingness to pay between participants who did not
see ordinal labels (M¼ 0.47, SD ¼ 0.11, CI95 ¼ [0.43,
0.50]) and participants who did see ordinal labels (M ¼
0.48, SD ¼ 0.10, CI95 ¼ [0.45, 0.50], t(115) ¼ 0.43, p ¼
.66, d¼ 0.08). Relative willingness to pay in these uniform
conditions was slightly lower than the relative attribute
level of 0.50, but this difference was not significant
(p> .09) and not systematic across studies.
A more comprehensive way of analyzing the data is to
regress rescaled willingness to pay for the intermediate op-
tion on the intermediate attribute level (0.25 ¼ 0.25 vs.
0.50¼ 0 vs. 0.75¼ 0.25), the presence of ordinal labels (no
labels ¼ 0 vs. ordinal labels ¼ 1), and the interaction be-
tween these two predictors. The parameter estimate for the
FIGURE 1
RESULTS OF STUDY 1: WILLINGNESS TO PAY AS A FUNCTION


































NOTE: For graphical purposes, the individual-level data points are jittered
horizontally.
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intermediate attribute level indicates the marginal effect of
a unit increase in the attribute on the subjective value for
participants who did not see ordinal labels. If changes at
the low and high ends of the attribute range have the same
impact as changes in the middle of the attribute range, and
thus value functions are linear regardless of attribute spac-
ing, we should find that the parameter estimate for the in-
termediate attribute level is equal to 1. The regression
analysis reveals that it is significantly lower than 1, but
greater than 0 (b¼ 0.43, CI95 ¼ [0.35, 0.51], t(530) ¼
10.41, p < .001, gp
2 ¼ .21), reflecting that, in the absence
of ordinal labels, the value function is concave in the accel-
erated condition and convex in the decelerated condition.
The parameter estimate for the interaction term indicates
whether this curvature is more or less pronounced when or-
dinal labels are present. The analysis reveals that it is sig-
nificantly negative (b ¼ 0.21, CI95 ¼ [0.31, 0.11],
t(530) ¼ 4.24, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .03), reflecting that, in the
presence of ordinal labels, the value function is more con-
cave in the accelerated condition and more convex in the
decelerated condition. Finally, the parameter estimate for
the presence of ordinal labels indicates how ordinal labels
influence willingness to pay when attribute levels are uni-
formly spaced. The analysis reveals that it is not signifi-
cantly different from 0 (b ¼ 0.01, CI95 ¼ [0.03, 0.01],
t(530) ¼ 0.87, p ¼ .39, gp2 ¼ .00), reflecting that ordinal
labels have no influence in the uniform condition.
Alternative Explanations?
In addition to ordinal comparisons shaping the value
function, it is possible that floor and/or ceiling effects in-
troduced curvature. Consider a participant who values the
12 inch pizza at $12 and the 18 inch pizza at $18. For the
14 inch pizza in the accelerated condition, there could be a
floor effect because there are only two dollar amounts con-
sistent with increasing marginal value ($12 and $13), but
four dollar amounts consistent with diminishing marginal
value ($15, $16, $17, and $18). For the 16 inch pizza in the
decelerated condition, there could be a ceiling effect be-
cause there are only two dollar amounts consistent with
diminishing marginal value ($17 and $18), but four dollar
amounts consistent with increasing marginal value ($12,
$13, $14, and $15). In other words, because judgments for
the intermediate size are constrained by the inferior and su-
perior sizes, there are more ways to give responses consis-
tent with diminishing marginal value when attribute levels
are spaced in an accelerated way, and vice versa, more
ways to give responses consistent with increasing marginal
value when attribute levels are spaced in a decelerated
way. We believe that this mechanism is unlikely to account
for our findings for three reasons. First, the individual-
level data depicted in the figures that accompany each
study reveal that few participants provide judgments for in-
termediate options that are close to their judgments for the
extreme options, suggesting that restriction of range is un-
likely producing the observed patterns. Second, studies 2
and 3 use choice as a dependent measure, for which the re-
striction of range is not an issue. Third, in studies 6 and 7,
we predict and find curvatures in the value function that
are inconsistent with this account.
Discussion
Study 1 examined the effects of attribute level spacing
and ordinal labels on curvature in the value function.
Depending on the spacing of attribute levels, we found
diminishing, constant, or increasing marginal value. The
observation of increasing marginal value is particularly
interesting because existing dual-process models of sub-
jective value cannot account for it. With regard to the ef-
fect of ordinal labels, one possible result could have been
a general increase or decrease in people’s willingness to
pay for the intermediate option, but that is not what we
found. Instead, when ordinal labels were presented, will-
ingness to pay for the intermediate option was higher
when attribute levels were spaced in an accelerated man-
ner but lower when attribute levels were spaced in a de-
celerated manner.
The effects of attribute spacing on subjective value we
find in study 1 are consistent with the literature on
range–frequency theory, which models judgments of
magnitude as a function of both cardinal and ordinal
properties of stimuli (Cooke et al. 2004; Niedrich et al.
2001, 2009; Parducci 1965; Parducci and Wedell 1986).
A recurring theme in this literature is whether observed
differences in judgments reflect that consumers really
perceive the stimuli differently (i.e., a difference in men-
tal representation) or perceive the stimuli in the same
way but interpret the rating scale differently (i.e., a re-
sponse language effect). This distinction is important be-
cause if the effects are merely at the level of the response
scale any observed difference may not carry over to other
measures, or influence downstream consumer behavior
(Lynch et al. 1991).
To examine generalizability across response scales, we
conducted two additional studies, which we describe in
more detail in the web appendix. Participants in study S2
indicated their willingness to pay for digital cameras, and
they indicated their expectations of picture quality on a 13-
point rating scale (1 ¼ “extremely low quality” and 13 ¼
“extremely high quality”). The effects of attribute spacing
on willingness to pay (an unbounded scale) and quality rat-
ings (a bounded scale) are similar. Study S3 extends our
findings from a single-attribute context to a multi-attribute
context, and to three additional product categories (apart-
ments, car insurances, and TVs). The effects of attribute-
level spacing are highly consistent across attributes and
product categories.
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The robustness of our findings across dependent meas-
ures, attributes, and categories suggests that the effects of
attribute-level spacing we observe on judgments of value
are at the level of the mental representation and thus should
influence meaningful consumer behavior. To further bol-
ster this conclusion, studies 2–4 examine the effects of
attribute-level spacing in a choice context and under
incentive-compatible conditions.
STUDY 2
The goal of study 2 was to examine how attribute-level
spacing and ordinal labels shape subjective value in a
choice context. We presented consumers with three coffee
sizes and their prices (which were the same for all partici-
pants), manipulating the spacing between the different
sizes and the presence of ordinal labels across participants,
as we did in the previous study. Because we observe only
one choice per participant, we cannot assess the curvature
in value functions at the individual level as we did in the
previous study. We do observe the proportion of partici-
pants who prefers the intermediate option and how that
proportion varies as a function of the size of the intermedi-
ate option, and the presence of ordinal labels. We expect
that participants will be influenced by cardinal distinctions
between alternatives and, thus, that more people will
choose the intermediate option as its size increases.
However, we also expect ordinal comparisons to influence
choice and, thus, that the size of the intermediate option
will matter less when ordinal labels are added to
alternatives.
Method
Five hundred respondents from Amazon Mechanical
Turk participated in the study for a small monetary reward
(177 females, Mage ¼ 29.96, SD ¼ 9.27). The study used a
3 (attribute spacing: accelerated vs. uniform vs. deceler-
ated)  2 (ordinal labels: no vs. yes) between-participant
design. We informed participants that a local coffee shop
sells coffee in three different sizes, priced at $1.99, $2.49,
and $2.99. The coffee sizes were spaced either in an
accelerated manner (12–14–20 ounces), a uniform manner
(12–16–20 ounces), or a decelerated manner (12–18–20
ounces), and they were presented either without ordinal
labels or with ordinal labels (e.g., small: 12 ounces vs. me-
dium: 14 ounces vs. large: 20 ounces). Participants indi-
cated which option they would choose. Because study 2
used choice as the dependent measure, there were no
monotonicity-related data exclusions.
Results
The Intermediate Option. Table 1 presents the propor-
tion of participants choosing each option as a function of
attribute spacing and presence of ordinal labels. As can be
seen from the table, preference for the intermediate option
increases with its size, but the increase is less pronounced
when participants see ordinal labels. In the condition with-
out labels, the choice share of the intermediate option in-
creased from 19.5% when it offered 14 ounces to 56.6%
when it offered 18 ounces. In the condition with labels, the
choice share of the intermediate option increased from
28.4% when it offered 14 ounces to 45.1% when it offered
18 ounces.
To examine the statistical significance of this pattern,
we estimated a logistic regression model, including as pre-
dictors the size of the intermediate option (accelerated: 14
¼ 2 vs. uniform: 16¼ 0 vs. decelerated: 18 ¼ þ2), the
presence of ordinal labels (no labels ¼ 0 vs. ordinal labels
¼ 1), and the interaction between these two variables. This
logistic model is analogous to the linear model presented
in study 1 (except that a coefficient equal to one for the
size of the intermediate option does not imply constant
marginal value). The parameter estimate for the size of the
intermediate option was positive and significant (b¼ 0.42,
CI95 ¼ [0.25, 0.59], z¼ 4.77, p < .001, OR ¼ 1.52), indi-
cating that choice shares increased with the size of the in-
termediate option when no ordinal labels were presented.
The parameter estimate for the interaction term was signifi-
cantly negative (b ¼ 0.24, CI95 ¼ [0.48, 0.01],
z¼ 2.01, p ¼ .04, OR ¼ 0.79), indicating that the effect of
intermediate option size on choice shares was attenuated
when ordinal labels were presented. The parameter
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF STUDY 2: CHOICE SHARES AS A FUNCTION OF ATTRIBUTE-LEVEL SPACING AND PRESENCE OF ORDINAL LABELS
Ordinal labels Spacing of attribute levels
Serving size (%)
12 oz. 14 oz. 16 oz. 18 oz. 20 oz.
No Accelerated 32.9 19.5 47.6
Uniform 37.6 37.6 24.7
Decelerated 30.1 56.6 13.3
Yes Accelerated 27.0 28.4 44.6
Uniform 35.3 40.0 24.7
Decelerated 39.6 45.1 15.4
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estimate for ordinal labels did not differ significantly from
zero (b¼ 0.04, CI95 ¼ [0.33, 0.42], z¼ 0.22, p ¼ .83, OR
¼ 1.04), indicating that ordinal labels did not influence
choice shares when attribute levels were uniformly spaced.
In sum, when alternatives are presented with ordinal
labels, cardinal distinctions have a smaller influence on
willingness to pay (study 1) and choice (study 2). We take
these findings to suggest that ordinal and cardinal compari-
sons jointly shape the subjective value of alternatives.
The Exterior Options. It is possible that ordinal labels
do not emphasize ordinal distinctions and de-emphasize
cardinal distinctions, but instead decrease attention to the
task. However, we do not observe more random responses
when ordinal labels are added (i.e., 33% choice shares for
the small, intermediate, and large options). For instance,
when attribute levels are uniformly spaced, participants did
discriminate between options (v2(2) ¼ 5.84, p¼ .05) and
ordinal labels had no influence on choice shares (v2(2) ¼
0.13, p¼ .94). We also do not observe that ordinal labels
systematically influence the choice shares of the extreme
options. Averaged across attribute-spacing conditions, or-
dinal labels had no influence on the choice share of the 12
ounce option (v2(1) ¼ 0.02, p¼ .88), nor for the 20 ounce
option (v2(1) ¼ 0.06, p¼ .80).
Note that relative choice shares between the 12 and 20
ounce servings do vary between attribute-spacing condi-
tions, in line with the similarity effect (Tversky 1972).
According to the similarity effect, preference for the 12
ounce option compared to the 20 ounce option should be
lower when the intermediate alternative is closer to the 12
ounce option (i.e., the 14 ounce intermediate alternative)
compared to when it is closer to the 20 ounce option (i.e.,
the 18 ounce intermediate alternative). We find that rela-
tive preference for the 12 ounce option (vs. the 20 ounce
option) was 39.5% when the intermediate option was
closer to the 12 ounce option, 59.6% when the intermediate
option was equidistant between the 12 ounce and the 14
ounce option, and 70.9% when the intermediate option was
closer to the 20 ounce option (b ¼ 0.31, CI95 ¼ [0.53,
0.10], z¼ 2.87, p ¼ .004, OR ¼ 0.73). The presence of
ordinal labels had no effect on the magnitude of the simi-
larity effect (b ¼ 0.05, CI95 ¼ [0.35, 0.25], z¼ 0.35, p
¼ .73, OR ¼ 0.95).
STUDY 3
Study 3 again examines how the spacing of attribute lev-
els influences choice depending on whether ordinal labels
are presented, but now for a consequential charity donation
decision. Research has demonstrated that donors have an
aversion to overhead, avoiding charities that spend a rela-
tively high fraction of donated funds on administrative and
fundraising costs (Gneezy, Keenan, and Gneezy 2014). We
presented participants with three charities that differed in
terms of “program percentage” (i.e., the percentage of do-
nated funds allocated to the advertised programs). We ma-
nipulated the program percentage of the intermediate
charity such that, for one half of participants, program per-
centages were spaced in an accelerated way (71–78–98%)
and, for the other half of participants, program percentages
were spaced in a decelerated way (71–91–98%). These
charities were presented with ordinal labels (letter grade:
“A,” “B,” or “C”), or without labels. Unlike in study 2,
where participants were forced to choose between the three
alternatives, participants in study 3 were asked if they
wanted to donate £10 to the intermediate charity or receive
£10 as a bonus payment. We expect that more people will
choose to donate when the program percentage of the inter-
mediate option is higher, but that the increase will be
smaller when ordinal labels are added to alternatives.
Method
Sample size, methods, payment, and analyses were con-
ducted in accordance with our preregistration (AsPredicted
#35978). One thousand two UK-based respondents
recruited through Prolific participated in the study for a
small monetary reward (669 females, Mage ¼ 37.69, SD ¼
11.81). There were no data exclusions. The study used a 2
(attribute spacing: accelerated vs. decelerated)  2 (ordinal
labels: no vs. yes) between-participant experimental de-
sign. Participants imagined we gave them a £10 bonus pay-
ment that they could choose to donate to a charity or keep
for themselves. We told participants that 50 respondents
would be randomly selected to have their decisions carried
out for real. That is, if the participant chose to donate the
£10 to the charity, we would send £10 to that charity, and
if the participant chose to keep the £10, we would add £10
as a bonus payment to their account. We selected three
charities verified by Charitywatch.org, a leading charity
comparison website, to present to participants. We
explained to participants that the charities varied in terms
of their program percentages. For all participants, the low-
est program percentage was 71% and the highest program
percentage was 98%, but the intermediate program per-
centage was either 78% or 91%, depending on whether par-
ticipants were assigned to the accelerated-spacing
condition or the decelerated-spacing condition. Participants
were randomly assigned to see the charities with or without
ordinal labels. In the condition with ordinal labels, partici-
pants saw the charities together with the labels: “grade A”
versus “grade B” versus “grade C.” In the condition with-
out ordinal labels, the charities were presented in the same
way, just without the “grades.”
Results
As in study 2, we observe only one choice per partici-
pant, so we cannot assess the curvature in value functions
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at the individual level. We do observe the proportion of
participants who chooses to donate to the intermediate
charity and how that proportion varies as a function of the
intermediate charity’s program percentage, and the pres-
ence of ordinal labels. Consistent with study 2, the percent-
age of participants choosing to donate increased with the
program percentage of the intermediate charity, but the in-
crease was less pronounced when participants saw ordinal
labels. In the condition without labels, donation likelihood
increased from 24.6% in the accelerated condition to
44.2% in the decelerated condition. In the condition with
ordinal labels, donation likelihood increased from 33.9%
in the accelerated condition to 38.0% in the decelerated
condition.
To examine the statistical significance of this pattern,
we estimated a logistic regression model, including as pre-
dictors the program percentage of the intermediate option
(accelerated: 78% ¼ 0.5 vs. decelerated: 91% ¼ 0.5), the
presence of ordinal labels (no labels ¼ 0.5 vs. ordinal
labels ¼ 0.5), and the interaction between these two varia-
bles. The parameter estimate for the program percentage of
the intermediate charity was positive and significant
(b¼ 0.53, CI95 ¼ [0.27, 0.80], z¼ 3.96, p < .001, OR ¼
1.70), indicating that choice shares increased when the pro-
gram percentage was higher when no ordinal labels were
presented. The parameter estimate for the interaction term
was significantly negative (b ¼ 0.71, CI95 ¼ [1.24,
0.18], z¼ 2.62, p ¼ .009, OR ¼ 0.49), indicating that the
effect of program percentage on donation likelihood was
attenuated when ordinal labels were presented. The param-
eter estimate for ordinal labels did not differ significantly
from zero (b¼ 0.10, CI95 ¼ [0.17, 0.36], z¼ 0.72, p ¼
.47, OR ¼ 1.10), indicating that ordinal labels did not in-
fluence donation likelihood on average.
STUDY 4
Study 4 examines curvature in the value function in a
consequential setting. We presented respondents from
Amazon Mechanical Turk with three surveys that vary in
length and asked them to indicate for each survey what the
minimum amount is we would have to pay them to com-
plete it. Participants listing amounts lower than our prede-
termined maximum willingness to pay received an
invitation to participate. We manipulated the length of the
intermediate survey between participants such that, for one
half of participants, survey lengths were spaced in an ac-
celerated way (8–10–18 questions) and, for the other half
of participants, survey lengths were spaced in a decelerated
way (8–16–18 questions). We expect that participants’ pri-
ces are a concave function of survey length when options
are spaced in an accelerated way but a convex function
when options are spaced in a decelerated way.
Another goal of study 4 (and the studies that follow) is
to provide evidence that curvature in value functions
depends on the extent to which people rely on system 1
versus system 2 processes. According to our account, sys-
tem 1 can approximate the cardinal distance between alter-
natives by making ordinal comparisons, but system 2 is
necessary to accurately interpret cardinal distance. Thus,
greater reliance on system 2 should increase the relative in-
fluence of cardinal distinctions on subjective value and re-
duce curvature in value functions. In study 4, we use the
CRT to measure individual differences in reliance on sys-
tem 1 versus system 2 processes (Frederick 2005; Toplak,
West, and Stanovich 2011). We expect to see more curva-
ture in the value functions of participants with lower scores
on the test. In other words, participants who are less likely
to engage system 2 processes should show more pro-
nounced diminishing marginal value when survey lengths
are spaced in an accelerated way and more pronounced in-
creasing marginal value when spaced in a decelerated way.
Method
Sample size, exclusion criteria, methods, payment, and
analyses were conducted in accordance with our preregis-
tration (AsPredicted #21485). Six hundred thirty respond-
ents from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in the
study for a small monetary reward (291 females, Mage ¼
36.58, SD ¼ 12.00). Participants first completed the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick 2005). We
scored their performance by counting the number of cor-
rect responses (range: 0–3; we report an analysis using the
sum of intuitive-incorrect responses as a measure of reli-
ance on system 1 processing in the web appendix). Next,
participants completed an unrelated survey about which
they were asked a few questions at the end, to verify atten-
tion. Sixty participants failed this attention check and were
rerouted to the end of the study. The other participants re-
ceived the following proposal: “We may have three more
surveys for you to potentially participate in for additional
payment. On the following page, you will be presented
some information about the surveys. For each survey, you
will indicate the minimum amount we would have to pay
you for your participation. If the prices you provide are ac-
ceptable to us, you will immediately be redirected to com-
plete these additional extra surveys. Upon completing any
extra survey(s) you will be paid the amount you specified
as a bonus payment to the current HIT (in addition to your
payment for the current survey). Depending on the prices
you set, you may be redirected to complete 0, 1, 2, or 3 ad-
ditional surveys.” We then asked participants if they were
interested in taking advantage of this opportunity. Forty-
three participants refused our offer and were rerouted to
the end of the study.
Finally, we presented three surveys with different
lengths to the 527 remaining participants, on a page that
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looked similar to those on the Mechanical Turk assignment
platform. For all participants, the shortest survey had
8 questions and the longest survey had 18 questions, but
the intermediate survey had either 10 questions or 16 ques-
tions, depending on whether participants were assigned to
the accelerated-spacing condition or the decelerated-
spacing condition. Participants entered their price for each
survey in the corresponding box. Sixty-nine participants
were excluded for providing responses that violated our
monotonicity criteria, leaving a final sample of 458
participants.
Our predetermined prices, unbeknownst to participants,
for the 8-, 10-, 16-, and 18-question surveys were $0.20,
$0.25, $0.40, and $0.45, respectively (i.e., 2.5 cents per
multiple-choice question). Participants entering prices
lower than ours were automatically rerouted to complete
that additional survey. Completion rates for the additional
surveys were 100%. We paid participants the prices they
had specified to their Mechanical Turk account.
Results
Figure 2 presents willingness to accept as a function of
survey length and CRT performance. As in study 1, we ob-
serve a concave value function when the spacing between
attribute levels is accelerated and a convex value function
when the spacing between attribute levels is decelerated.
Importantly, the extent of diminishing and increasing mar-
ginal value appears less pronounced for participants with
higher CRT scores.
To examine the statistical significance of these patterns,
we first compared relative willingness to accept with rela-
tive attribute levels, as in study 1. When survey length was
spaced in an accelerated manner, relative willingness to ac-
cept for the intermediate survey was 0.29 (SD ¼ 0.23, CI95
¼ [0.26, 0.32]). This is significantly higher than the rela-
tive attribute level of the intermediate survey, which was
0.20 by design (t(234) ¼ 6.18, p < .001, d¼ 0.81), imply-
ing diminishing marginal value. When survey length was
spaced in a decelerated manner, relative willingness to ac-
cept for the intermediate survey was 0.63 (SD ¼ 0.25, CI95
¼ [0.60, 0.67]). This is significantly lower than the relative
attribute level of the intermediate survey, which was 0.80
by design (t(222) ¼ 9.87, p < .001, d¼ 1.33), implying in-
creasing marginal value.
To examine the relationship between CRT performance
and curvature in value functions, we regressed willingness
to accept for the intermediate option on the intermediate at-
tribute level (0.20 ¼ 0.30 vs. 0.80¼ 0.30), CRT scores
(mean-centered), and the interaction between these two
predictors. The parameter estimate for the intermediate at-
tribute level in this model indicates the marginal effect of a
unit increase in the attribute on the subjective value for a
participant with an average performance on the CRT. If
changes at the low and high ends of the attribute range had
the same impact as changes in the middle of the attribute
range, and thus value functions were linear regardless of at-
tribute spacing, we should find that the parameter estimate
for the intermediate attribute level is equal to 1. We find a
coefficient significantly lower than 1, but greater than 0
(b¼ 0.57, CI95 ¼ [0.50, 0.64], t(454) ¼ 15.19, p < .001,
gp
2 ¼ .33), reflecting that the value function is concave in
the accelerating condition and convex in the decelerating
condition. The parameter estimate for the interaction term
indicates whether this curvature is more or less pronounced
for participants who score higher on the CRT. The analysis
reveals that it is significantly positive (b¼ 0.08, CI95 ¼
[0.02, 0.14], t(454) ¼ 2.55, p ¼ .01, gp2 ¼ .01), reflecting
that the value function is more linear for participants who
rely more on system 2 processes. Finally, the parameter es-
timate for CRT in the model above indicates the relation-
ship between CRT performance and willingness to pay, on
average taken across the accelerated and decelerated condi-
tions. We find a coefficient that is not significantly differ-
ent from 0 (b¼ 0.01, CI95 ¼ [0.01, 0.03], t(454) ¼ 0.75,
p ¼ .46, gp2 ¼ .00).
In sum, study 4 demonstrates in an incentive-compatible
context that attribute spacing creates curvature in subjec-
tive value functions and that this effect is stronger for par-
ticipants who are less likely to engage system 2 processes.
To further explore the data, we calculated the geometric
means of participants’ willingness to accept (to account for
FIGURE 2
RESULTS OF STUDY 4: WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT AS A
FUNCTION OF ATTRIBUTE-LEVEL SPACING AND



































NOTE: For graphical purposes, the individual-level data points are jittered
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the positive skew in responses). In the accelerated-spacing
condition, average willingness to accept was 39 cents for
the 8-question survey and 80 cents for the 18-question sur-
vey. If participants had constant marginal value, we would
have expected participants to ask 47.2 cents for the 10-
question survey. Instead, participants asked 51.5 cents for
the 10-question survey, 9.1% more than expected assuming
constant marginal value, reflecting concavity in the value
function. Similarly, in the decelerated-spacing condition,
average willingness to accept was 39 cents for the 8-ques-
tion survey and 78 cents for the 18-question survey. If par-
ticipants had constant marginal value, we would have
expected participants to charge 70.2 cents for the 16-ques-
tion survey. Instead, participants asked 62.9 cents for the
16-question survey, 10.4% less than expected assuming
constant marginal value, reflecting convexity in the value
function.
The results above suggest that participants in the
accelerated-spacing condition overvalued the intermediate
survey relative to the short and long surveys, while partici-
pants in the decelerated-spacing condition undervalued the
intermediate survey. Because our willingness to accept per
question was the same (i.e., 2.5 cents per question), regard-
less of survey length and attribute spacing, we should find
that participants in the accelerated-spacing condition are
relatively less likely to receive an invitation for the inter-
mediate survey compared to participants in the
decelerated-spacing condition. Indeed, in the accelerated-
spacing condition, 30.9% of invitations we sent out were
for the intermediate survey. This is lower than in the
decelerated-spacing condition, where 49.0% of invitations
we sent out were for the intermediate survey (Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon W¼ 659, p < .001). Conclusions are
similar when analyzing the likelihood of being hired for
each survey with a multi-level logistic regression model.
STUDY 5
While study 4 provides correlational evidence, study 5
aims to provide causal evidence for our dual-process model
of subjective value. Participants in the study indicate their
willingness to pay for three printers, either under time pres-
sure or not. Prior research suggests that time pressure
inhibits system 2 processing, increasing the relative reli-
ance on system 1 processes (Dhar and Gorlin 2013;
Finucane et al. 2000; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988).
The printers were described to participants either in terms
of print speed, such that they were spaced in an accelerated
way (10–15–30 pages per minute) or in terms of print time,
such that they were spaced in a uniform way (6–4–
2 seconds per page). Note that manipulating attribute spac-
ing in this way holds constant the objective performance of
the printers across conditions (10 ppm ¼ 6 spp, 15 ppm ¼
4 spp, and 30 ppm ¼ 2 spp). Our account predicts that
greater reliance on system 1 processes increases curvature
in value functions when options are spaced in an acceler-
ated way, but not when options are spaced in a uniform
way. We thus expect to find that time pressure changes the
shape of the value function when printers are described in
terms of print speed, but not when printers are described in
terms of print time.
Method
Sample size, exclusion criteria, methods, and analysis
were conducted in accordance with our preregistration
(AsPredicted #14982). One thousand forty respondents
from Amazon Mechanical Turk participated in the study
for a small monetary reward (583 females, Mage ¼ 36.48,
SD ¼ 11.85). We excluded data from 79 participants who
failed an attention check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and
Davidenko 2009), 10 participants with duplicate I.P.
addresses, and 130 participants who violated our monoto-
nicity criteria, leaving a sample of 821 participants. The
study used a 2 (attribute spacing: uniform vs. accelerated)
 2 (time pressure: no vs. yes) between-participant design.
Participants completed the task either without time pres-
sure or with time pressure. In both conditions, we asked
participants to imagine that they print many documents at
home and they were in need of a new printer. We informed
participants that we would ask them how much they were
willing to pay for three printers. In the time-pressure condi-
tion, we informed participants that they would see a timer
that provides a recommended amount of time, but they
could take as long as necessary to evaluate the printers,
and that their response time would not influence their pay-
ment. When participants evaluated the printers, there was a
timer at the top of the screen counting down from 8 sec-
onds. After 8 seconds, the border of the screen began flash-
ing red, but the page did not auto-advance after the time
was up. Printers were specified in terms of pages per min-
ute (10–15–30 ppm) or seconds per page (6–4–2 spp).
Results
Figure 3 visualizes willingness to pay when printers
were described in terms of print time and thus spaced in a
uniform way (left panel) and when printers were described
in terms of print speed and thus spaced in an accelerated
way (right panel), for participants who made judgments un-
der time pressure (triangles) versus not (circles). As can be
seen from the graph, time pressure had no effect on curva-
ture in the value function when printers were described in
terms of print time but increased curvature when printers
were described in terms of print speed.
To examine the statistical significance of this pattern,
we regressed willingness to pay for the intermediate option
on attribute spacing (seconds per page ¼ 0 vs. pages per
minute ¼ 1), time pressure (no ¼ 0 vs. yes ¼ 1), and the
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interaction between these two predictors. This analysis
revealed a significant interaction effect (b¼ 0.07, CI95 ¼
[0.02, 0.11], t(817) ¼ 2.82, p ¼ .005, gp2 ¼ .01), suggest-
ing that the effect of time pressure differed depending on
whether printers were specified in terms of seconds per
page or pages per minute. When printers were described in
terms of seconds per page, and thus spaced in a uniform
manner, time pressure had no significant effect on willing-
ness to pay (Mno ¼ 0.45 vs. Myes ¼ 0.44; b ¼ 0.00, CI95
¼ [0.03, 0.03], t(384) ¼ 0.03, p ¼ .98, gp2 ¼ .00). When
printers were described in terms of pages per minute, and
thus spaced in an accelerated way, willingness to pay was
higher under time pressure (Mno ¼ 0.35 vs. Myes ¼ 0.42;
b¼ 0.07, CI95 ¼ [0.03, 0.10], t(433) ¼ 4.03, p < .001, gp2
¼ .04).
Discussion
The primary goal of study 5 was to provide causal evi-
dence that system 1 processes produce curvature in value
functions when attribute levels are unevenly spaced. There
is another implication of the study which we find interest-
ing. System 1 processes are often seen as a detriment for
good decision-making, but study 5 illustrates this need not
be the case. Prior research suggests that the pages-per-
minute metric can be misleading, because consumers fail
to realize that the relationship between print speed and
print time is nonlinear. When printers are described to con-
sumers both in terms of pages per minute and seconds per
page, consumers become aware of the nonlinearity, and
their willingness to pay changes accordingly (de Langhe
and Puntoni 2016; de Langhe, Puntoni, and Larrick 2017).
We can thus use participants’ judgments in the seconds-
per-page conditions as a benchmark for evaluating partici-
pants’ judgments in the pages-per-minute condition. This
comparison reveals that the bias introduced by the pages-
per-minute metric is substantially reduced when partici-
pants made judgments under time pressure (i.e., the will-
ingness to pay for 15 pages per minute better approximated
the willingness to pay for 4 seconds per page). More gener-
ally, whether reliance on system 1 processing can help or
harm decisions appears to depend in part on the relation-
ship between the metric that is presented to consumers and
the benefit that consumers ultimately care about.
STUDY 6
Study 6 builds on the idea that system 2 processes moni-
tor the accuracy of system 1 processes and intervene when
judgment quality suffers too much (Evans and Stanovich
2013; Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996; Payne, Bettman,
FIGURE 3




















































NOTE: For graphical purposes, the individual-level data points are jittered horizontally.
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and Johnson 1993). If ordinal comparisons are used as a
mental shortcut to assess cardinal distance, they should in-
fluence judgments more when they provide a good approx-
imation for cardinal distance, but less when they provide a
poor approximation.
We presented participants with three different coffee
sizes, either spaced in an accelerated or in a decelerated
way. For about half of participants, the options were
spaced such that ordinal comparisons provide a good ap-
proximation of cardinal distance (10–14–20 in the acceler-
ated condition and 10–16–20 in the decelerated condition).
For the other half of participants, the options were spaced
such that ordinal comparisons provide a poor approxima-
tion of cardinal distance (10–12–20 in the accelerated con-
dition and 10–18–20 in the decelerated condition). We
predict that ordinal comparisons will have a larger influ-
ence on subjective value when they more closely approxi-
mate cardinal distance.
To assess differences in curvature in this study, we can-
not directly compare rescaled willingness to pay for the in-
termediate option in the conditions where heuristic
accuracy is high versus low. This is because the intermedi-
ate attribute levels differ across these conditions. For in-
stance, when attributes are spaced in an accelerated way,
the intermediate attribute level is 20% of the way between
the inferior and superior option in the condition where heu-
ristic accuracy is low, but 40% of the way in the condition
where heuristic accuracy is high. Rescaled value judgments
will thus be higher in the latter condition. We therefore use
a different analysis strategy that allows us to compare the
relative influence of ordinal versus cardinal comparisons
on value functions. Following range–frequency theory
(Parducci 1965), we can express the subjective value of
any given attribute level, V(xi), as follows:






where (Rank (xi) 1)/(N 1) is the proportion of the N
available attribute levels that are less desirable and
(xi xinf)/(xsup xinf) is the distance of the focal attribute
level relative to the inferior versus the superior attribute
level. The relative influence of ordinal comparisons (i.e.,
the first part of the equation) versus cardinal comparisons
(i.e., the second part of the equation) is indicated by a
weighting parameter, w, that is constrained between 0 and
1, where higher w indicates greater reliance on cardinal
comparisons. Ordinal comparisons can produce curvature
in value functions (depending on the cardinal distances be-
tween attribute levels). Cardinal comparisons, instead, pro-
duce constant marginal value. We expect to see a relatively
greater influence of ordinal comparisons, and thus a lower
w, when heuristic accuracy is high.
Method
Three hundred twenty-two respondents from Amazon
Mechanical Turk participated in the study for a small mon-
etary reward (128 females, Mage ¼ 32.00, SD ¼ 11.07).
Eleven participants provided responses that violated our
monotonicity criteria leaving a sample of 311 participants.
The study used a 2 (attribute spacing: accelerated vs. decel-
erated)  2 (heuristic accuracy: low vs. high) between-
participant design. We told participants that a local coffee
shop sells three different serving sizes and asked how
much they were willing to pay for each size. The smallest
coffee size was always 10 ounces and the largest 20 oun-
ces, but we manipulated the position of the intermediate
size. For about half of participants, ordinal comparisons
provided a better approximation of cardinal distance (i.e.,
high heuristic accuracy): 14 ounces in the accelerated con-
dition and 16 ounces in the decelerated condition. For the
other half of participants, ordinal comparisons poorly ap-
proximated cardinal distance (i.e., low heuristic accuracy):
12 ounces in the accelerated condition and 18 ounces in the
decelerated condition.
Results
Figure 4 plots willingness to pay as a function of at-
tribute levels in the conditions with low (left panel) ver-
sus high heuristic accuracy (right panel). Short
horizontal lines indicate the expected willingness to pay
for the intermediate coffee size if participants’ judg-
ments were exclusively determined by ordinal compari-
sons or cardinal comparisons. Gray points (horizontally
jittered) indicate participants’ willingness to pay for the
intermediate size. The location of participants’ average
judgments relative to these two lines gives an indication
of the extent to which ordinal versus cardinal compari-
sons influence judgments. As can be seen from the fig-
ure, ordinal comparisons seem to have a greater
influence when heuristic accuracy is high.
To examine the relative influence of ordinal versus
cardinal comparisons across conditions, we estimate the
weighting parameter, w, using a Bayesian estimation
procedure, which we explain in more detail in the web
appendix. One benefit of this procedure is that it pro-
vides parameter estimates that are more robust to out-
liers and non-normally distributed error terms compared
to least-squares or maximum-likelihood approaches
(Kruschke 2014). The latter approaches yield similar
conclusions but inflate effect sizes. We model w as a
function of an intercept term, attribute spacing (acceler-
ated ¼ 0 vs. decelerated ¼ 1), heuristic accuracy (low
¼ 0 vs. high ¼ 1), and their interaction. Estimates for
w were significantly lower, implying a greater influence
of ordinal comparisons, when heuristic accuracy was
high (Mw ¼ 0.24, CI95 [0.18, 0.34]) versus low (Mw ¼
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0.45, CI95 [0.40, 0.51]; MDifference ¼ 0.21, CI95 [0.11,
0.27]; note that Bayesian 95% credible intervals are
draws from the posterior predictive distribution. As
such, mean values do not need to sit symmetrically
within the interval, as is necessarily the case in frequent-
ist confidence intervals.) Estimates for w were also sig-
nificantly higher, implying a greater influence of
cardinal comparisons, when attribute levels were spaced
in an accelerated way (Mw ¼ 0.43, CI95 [0.39, 0.50])
versus a decelerated way (Mw ¼ 0.26, CI95 [0.19, 0.36];
MDifference ¼ 0.17, CI95 [0.06, 0.25]), an effect we did
not anticipate but could be interesting to explore in fu-
ture research. There was no interaction between heuristic
accuracy and attribute spacing (MDifference ¼ 0.01, CI95
[0.16, 0.13]).
At the end of study 1, we discussed how patterns of de-
creasing and increasing marginal value may be produced in
a mechanistic way, instead of based on ordinal compari-
sons. Note that floor and ceiling effects, to the extent that
they occur, should be more pronounced in the conditions
with low heuristic accuracy (i.e., 12 and 18 ounces) be-
cause these values are closer to the floor and ceiling im-
posed by the extreme options. However, consistent with
our account, we found that ordinal comparisons are more
influential in the conditions with high heuristic accuracy
(i.e., 14 and 16 ounces).
STUDY 7
The goal of study 7 is to demonstrate that reliance on
system 1 processes can also produce inverse S-shaped and
S-shaped value functions. To see this, consider the left
panel in figure 5 with five attribute levels, two of which
are at the very low end of the range, one in the middle, and
two at the high end. For this spacing of attribute levels, we
predict inverse S-shaped value functions that are more pro-
nounced when people rely more on system 1 processes.
The right panel in figure 5 also has five attribute levels, but
now three attribute levels lie very close to the middle of
the attribute range. For this spacing of attribute levels, we
predict S-shaped value functions that are more pronounced
when people rely more on system 1 processes.
We again manipulate reliance on system 1 versus sys-
tem 2 processes in a different way. We build on the idea
that system 2 processes are effortful and that people shift
from more to less effortful decision strategies when deci-
sions are more complex (Evans and Stanovich 2013;
Kahneman and Frederick 2002). For instance, when there
are more alternatives to choose from, or alternatives differ
along more attributes, people shift from more effortful,
compensatory decision rules to less effortful, non-
compensatory heuristics (Payne 1976; Payne et al. 1993;
Shah and Oppenheimer 2008). We manipulate whether
FIGURE 4































































NOTE: For graphical purposes, the individual-level data points are jittered horizontally.
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the alternatives presented to participants differ along a
single attribute or along multiple attributes. Thus, we ex-
pect that ordinal comparisons exert a greater influence in
a multi-attribute context (lower w) than a single-attribute
context (i.e., higher w), which should translate to both
more pronounced inverse S-shaped and S-shaped value
functions.
Method
Two hundred two respondents from Amazon
Mechanical Turk participated in study 7 for a small mone-
tary reward (78 females, Mage ¼ 33.29, SD ¼ 9.93).
Twenty-eight participants provided responses that violated
our monotonicity criteria leaving a sample of 174 partici-
pants. The study used a 2 (number of attributes: single vs.
multiple)  2 (intermediate attribute levels: spread out vs.
centered) between-participant design.
All participants saw five apartments and indicated for
each apartment how much they were willing to pay per
month in an average rental market. In the single-
attribute condition, apartments were described to partici-
pants as identical, except for their size. This is the focal
attribute in the study for which we manipulate the spac-
ing of the attribute levels. For about half of participants,
the three intermediate attribute levels were spread out
across the whole range, as in the left panel of figure 5
(1,000–1,025–1,500–1,975–2,000 square feet). For the
other half of participants, the three intermediate attribute
levels were centered, as in the right panel of figure 5
(1,000–1,475–1,500–1,525–2,000 square feet). Note that
we expect to find an inverse S-shaped value function
when attribute levels are spread out but an S-shaped
value function when attribute levels are centered. When
attribute levels are spread out, floor and ceiling effects
may push judgments up for the second attribute level
and down for the fourth attribute level, in the direction
of an inverse S-shaped value function. However, floor
and ceiling effects are unlikely when attribute levels are
centered, because the intermediate attribute levels are far
from the extremes. Demonstrating inverse S-shaped
value functions together with S-shaped value functions
therefore increases our confidence that floor and ceiling
effects have minimal explanatory power, as we discussed
in study 1.
In the multiple-attribute condition, we informed partici-
pants that apartments also varied in terms of three binary
attributes: flooring (carpet vs. laminate), location in the
building (first vs. fourth floor), and layout (one level vs.
two levels). We selected these additional attributes based
on a pretest, which indicated that these non-focal attributes
were considered to be important (so participants would at-
tend to them) and that the attribute levels were equally de-
sirable, on average. Importantly, across participants, the
FIGURE 5

























Multi-Attribute (w = 0.33)
Single-Attribute (w = 0.66)
NOTE: The dotted lines reflect greater reliance on system 2 processes and thus a relatively greater influence of cardinal comparisons (w ¼ 0.66). The solid lines reflect
greater reliance on system 1 processes and thus a relatively greater influence of ordinal comparisons (w ¼ 0.33).
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three additional attributes in the multi-attribute condition
were uncorrelated with the square footage of the
apartments.
Results
Figure 6 plots willingness to pay as a function of relative
attribute levels. Gray points (horizontally jittered) are par-
ticipants’ willingness to pay for the intermediate apartment
sizes. As can be seen from the figure, the relationship be-
tween square footage and willingness to pay is inverse S-
shaped when intermediate attribute levels are spread out
(left panel) and S-shaped when intermediate attribute lev-
els are centered (right panel). Crucially, these patterns
seem more pronounced when apartments varied along mul-
tiple attributes (triangles) versus a single attribute (circles),
suggesting that ordinal comparisons exert a greater
influence.
Similar to study 6, we model w as a function of an inter-
cept, the number of attributes (single ¼ 0 vs. multiple ¼
1), attribute spacing (spread out ¼ 0 vs. centered ¼ 1), and
their interaction using a hierarchical Bayesian estimation
procedure, described in more detail in the web appendix.
Estimates for w were significantly lower, implying a
greater influence of ordinal comparisons, in the multi-
attribute condition (Mw ¼ 0.55, CI95 [0.46, 0.65]) than in
the single-attribute condition (Mw ¼ 0.71, CI95 [0.66,
0.75]; MDifference ¼ 0.16, CI95 [0.22, 0.06]).
Estimates for w were also significantly lower, implying a
greater influence of ordinal comparisons, when attribute
levels were spread out (Mw ¼ 0.54, CI95 [0.48, 0.60]) ver-
sus centered (Mw ¼ 0.72, CI95 [0.64, 0.78]; MDifference ¼
0.18, CI95 [0.22, 0.11]). In other words, the inverse
S-shape was relatively more pronounced than the S-shape,
which could be because floor and ceiling effects push judg-
ments toward an inverse S-shape when attribute levels are
spread out, but away from an S-shape when attribute levels
are centered, as we discussed above. There was a small in-
teraction effect indicating that the influence of the multi-
attribute manipulation was stronger when attributes were
spread out (MDifference ¼ 0.03, CI95 [0.05, 0.01]).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary of Findings
A foundational idea in marketing is that products can be
seen as bundles of attributes and that demand for products
can be traced to how consumers value individual product
attributes. Academics and practitioners often assume that
increments along quantitative attributes have diminishing
marginal value. Existing dual-process accounts of subjec-
tive value propose that such diminishing marginal value
FIGURE 6

















































NOTE: For graphical purposes, the individual-level data points are jittered horizontally.
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can be traced to system 1 processes and that system 1 pro-
cesses uniquely produce diminishing marginal value.
Our findings challenge these assumptions. We found
diminishing marginal value when attribute levels were
spaced in an accelerated manner, constant marginal value
when attribute levels were spaced in a uniform manner, but
increasing marginal value when attribute levels were
spaced in a decelerated manner. These patterns were more
pronounced when alternatives were presented with ordinal
labels (studies 1–3), for people with lower scores on the
CRT (study 4), when people made judgments under time
pressure (study 5), when ordinal comparisons provided a
better approximation of cardinal distance (study 6), and
when products varied along more attributes (study 7).
Theoretical Contribution
The studies reported in this article add to our under-
standing of how system 1 processes influence curvature in
value functions. One key difference between our studies
and existing studies on dual-processes and subjective value
is the number of attribute levels that each participant sees.
In prior studies, each participant saw one of two attribute
levels presented in isolation. Because system 1 is sensitive
only to the presence versus absence of an attribute, it has
been associated with diminishing marginal value (Hsee
and Rottenstreich 2004; Hsee et al. 2005; Hsee and Zhang
2010). In our studies, each participant sees three or more
attribute levels. We find that system 1 can produce a myr-
iad of curvatures, depending on the spacing of attribute
levels, because it has a penchant for ordinal rank.
The studies reported in this article also qualify our un-
derstanding of how evaluation mode influences curvature
in value functions. Prior studies have compared the shape
of the value function when participants see one of the two
attribute levels presented in isolation (i.e., separate evalua-
tion) versus both attribute levels at the same time (i.e., joint
evaluation). These studies suggest that value functions are
more linear when judgments are made in joint evaluation
mode (Hsee and Zhang 2010). In our studies, participants
always jointly evaluate three or more attribute levels. We
find that value functions strongly deviate from linearity,
depending on how attribute levels are spaced. The effect of
attribute-level spacing on marginal value is large and ro-
bust (with Cohen’s ds ranging between 0.81 and 2.47, and
gp
2s between 0.21 and 0.33; Cohen 1988).
While the curvatures we find are consistent with range–
frequency theory (Parducci 1965), we also find that the de-
gree of curvature depends on the extent to which consum-
ers rely on system 1 versus system 2 processes. We
therefore suggest a hierarchical structure such that system
1 processes facilitate ordinal comparisons while system 2
processes are necessary to accurately assess cardinal dis-
tance. Compared to the influence of attribute-level spacing,
the influence of reliance on system 1 versus system 2 proc-
essing is smaller, but the effects are consequential and of
practical significance (with Cohen’s ds ranging between
0.29 and 0.51 and gp
2s between 0.01 and 0.04; Cohen
1988).
In sum, our contribution lies in combining elements
from previously unconnected literatures. This combination
provides a more nuanced understanding of how and when
product differentiation can create subjective value for con-
sumers. For instance, we predict a myriad of curvatures
(depending on the spacing between alternatives) and that
these curvatures tend to be more pronounced for consumers
that rely more on system 1 processes, either because they
are predisposed to do so (e.g., study 4), because the deci-
sion environment does not allow for more systematic infor-
mation processing (e.g., studies 5 and 7), or because the
benefits of systematic information processing are minimal
(e.g., study 6).
Practical Implications
Consumer Welfare. Companies often describe their
products to consumers using quantitative metrics, but these
metrics do not always relate linearly to the benefit consum-
ers care about (Hsee et al. 2003; Larrick and Soll 2008).
For instance, the state of New York decided to sue Internet
service providers, in part because the megabit-per-second
metric they use is nonlinearly related to the consumer ben-
efit in terms of download time (The People of the State of
New York v. Charter Communications 2018). Their case is
based in part on de Langhe and Puntoni (2016) who dem-
onstrated that consumers may be spending more than they
would want to spend if they properly understood the rela-
tionship between download speed and download time.
Nonuniform spacing of options can exacerbate consumers’
misunderstanding of nonlinear relationships between met-
rics and benefits. For instance, pizzas are often described
in terms of their diameter (as in study 1), but consumers ac-
tually care about the total amount of pizza they are buying,
or the area of a pizza. The relationship between a circle’s
diameter and its area is convex. This is especially problem-
atic if alternative sizes are spaced in an accelerated way.
For instance, Debonairs Pizza offers three sizes with diam-
eters 19, 23, and 30 cm. If consumers were sensitive only
to the cardinal distinctions in diameter, they would under-
estimate the area increase associated with a diameter in-
crease from 23 to 30 cm relative to a diameter increase
from 19 to 23 cm, and hence order too much pizza. If con-
sumers were also sensitive to ordinal rank, the problem
would be exacerbated, and presenting the pizza sizes with
ordinal labels would further harm consumer welfare.
The Compromise Effect. Consumers tend to prefer
compromise options (Chernev 2004; Cooke et al. 2004;
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Dhar, Nowlis, and Sherman 2000; Kivetz, Netzer, and
Srinivasan 2004; Simonson 1989) but managers may be
unsure about where to position the intermediate attribute
level. Imagine a coffee shop offers 10 ounce coffees for $3
and 20 ounce coffees for $5, and is looking to add a com-
promise option. Our studies suggest that consumers are rel-
atively insensitive to the ounces offered by the
intermediate option, because the ordinal rank remains
unchanged (i.e., the intermediate option is always second
out of 3). In addition, consumers will be even less sensitive
when managers use labels that highlight ordinal rank (e.g.,
“small,” “medium,” and “large”; study 1), when decisions
are made under time pressure (study 5), or when managers
highlight other product attributes (study 7).
Aligning Consumers’ Willingness to Pay with Firm
Costs. Study 7 suggests that value functions can take vir-
tually any monotonic shape, such as an inverse S-shape or
an S-shape, depending on how the intermediate options are
positioned. From a managerial point of view, this is impor-
tant to take into account when marginal costs have discon-
tinuities (e.g., requiring different production materials and
equipment to scale up computer processor power from 2.4
to 4.0 GHz). Firms can use the insights in this article to ad-
just the composition of their product offerings so that con-
sumer subjective value maps more closely to the firm’s
cost functions.
Future Research
The implications of our research go beyond product dif-
ferentiation. For instance, when consumers have a goal of
paying off 100% of their debt, they are most motivated
when they first start paying down their debt and when they
have almost paid off the entire debt and are less motivated
in the middle of their goal progress (Bonezzi, Brendl, and
De Angelis 2011; Huang, Jin, and Zhang 2017). At the be-
ginning of the goal progress, consumers use 0% as their
reference point and exhibit diminishing marginal sensitiv-
ity to goal progress. That is, the goal progress of the first
5% paid off feels subjectively larger than that of the second
5% paid off. When approaching the completion of their
goal, consumers shift their reference points to 100% and
evaluate how much is left to pay off. In this case, the goal
progress of the last 5% feels subjectively larger than that of
the second-to-last 5%. This research suggests that subgoals
can be used to increase motivation (e.g., paying off 25%,
50%, and 75%). Extrapolating from study 7, one could pre-
dict that it is better to cluster subgoals in the middle of the
range (e.g., paying off 40%, 50%, and 60%) where motiva-
tion tends to be lowest. If consumers process not only their
cardinal progress (e.g., amount of debt paid off) but also
their ordinal progress (e.g., completing their second then
third subgoals), clustering the subgoals in the middle
should increase perceived goal progress in the middle of
the range. This technique would be particularly effective in
environments where consumers are more likely to rely on
system 1 processes (e.g., dieting).
Conclusion
Few ideas are as deeply rooted in marketing as the prin-
ciple of diminishing marginal sensitivity. It has shaped our
understanding of how consumers pursue their goals (see
above; Heath, Larrick, and Wu 1999; Kivetz, Urminsky,
and Zheng 2006), how they form preferences for products
and brands (Chandon and Ordabayeva 2009; Hardie,
Johnson, and Fader 1993), how much they consume
(Galak, Redden, and Kruger 2009), why they seek variety
(Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman 1999), and how satisfied
they feel after consumption (Mittal, Ross, and Baldasare
1998). The current research has the potential to influence
theoretical and substantive work in all these domains.
DATA COLLECTION INFORMATION
The first author programmed studies 1, 2, 6, and S2 in
Qualtrics and collected the data via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk. The second author programmed studies S1 and S3 in
Authorware and recruited University of Colorado under-
graduate students as participants. The third author pro-
grammed studies 4, 5, and 7 in Qualtrics with
supplementary java-script and collected the data via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The first and third authors
programmed study 3 in Qualtrics and collected the data via
Prolific’s UK-based population. All data analysis (includ-
ing the Bayesian modeling) was conducted by the first au-
thor in collaboration with the second author. Study 1 was
collected in January 2014, study 2 in May 2014, study 3 in
February 2020, study 4 in April 2019, study 5 in October
2018, study 6 in January 2015, study 7 in September 2016,
study S1 in October 2013, study S2 in June 2013, and study
S3 in October 2013.
REFERENCES
Anobile, Giovanni, Guido Marco Cicchini, and David C. Burr
(2012), “Linear Mapping of Numbers onto Space Requires
Attention,” Cognition, 122 (3), 454–9.
Aydinoglu, N_Ilüfer Z. and Aradhna Krishna (2011), “Guiltless
Gluttony: The Asymmetric Effect of Size Labels on Size
Perceptions and Consumption,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 37 (6), 1095–112.
Bonezzi, Andrea, Miguel C. Brendl, and Matteo De Angelis
(2011), “Stuck in the Middle: The Psychophysics of Goal
Pursuit,” Psychological Science, 22 (5), 607–12.
Brannon, Elizabeth M. (2002), “The Development of Ordinal
Numerical Knowledge in Infancy,” Cognition, 83 (3),
223–40.






/jcr/article/47/4/566/5815984 by guest on 28 D
ecem
ber 2020
Brannon, Elizabeth M. and Herbert S. Terrace (1998), “Ordering
of the Numerosities 1 to 9 by Monkeys,” Science, 282 (5389),
746–9.
Chaiken, Shelly and Yaacov Trope. (1999), Dual-Process
Theories in Social Psychology, New York, NY: Guilford.
Chandon, Pierre and Nailya Ordabayeva (2009), “Supersize in
One Dimension, Downsize in Three Dimensions: Effects of
Spatial Dimensionality on Size Perceptions and Preferences,”
Journal of Marketing Research, 46 (6), 739–53.
Chang, Hannah H. and Michel Tuan Pham (2018), “Affective
Boundaries of Scope Insensitivity,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 45 (2), 403–28.
Chernev, Alexander (2004), “Extremeness Aversion and
Attribute-Balance Effects in Choice,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 31 (2), 249–63.
Cohen, Jacob. (1988), Statistical Power Analysis for the
Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed., Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cooke, Alan D. J., Chris Janiszewski, Marcus Cunha Jr., Suzanne
A. Nasco, and Els De Wilde (2004), “Stimulus Context and
the Formation of Consumer Ideals,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 31 (1), 112–24.
Cunha, Marcus Jr. and Jeffrey D. Shulman (2011), “Assimilation
and Contrast in Price Evaluations,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 37 (5), 822–35.
de Langhe, Bart and Stefano Puntoni (2016), “Productivity
Metrics and Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Time
Savings,” Journal of Marketing Research, 53 (3), 396–406.
de Langhe, Bart, Stefano Puntoni, and Richard Larrick (2017),
“Linear Thinking in a Nonlinear World,” Harvard Business
Review, 95 (May–June), 130–9.
Dehaene, Stanislas. (2011), The Number Sense: How the Mind
Creates Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dehaene, Stanislas, Manuela Piazza, Philippe Pinel, and Laurent
Cohen (2003), “Three Parietal Circuits for Number
Processing,” Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20 (3–6), 487–506.
Dhar, Ravi and Margarita Gorlin (2013), “A Dual-System
Framework to Understand Preference Construction Processes
in Choice,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 23 (4),
528–42.
Dhar, Ravi, Stephen M. Nowlis, and Steven J. Sherman (2000),
“Trying Hard or Hardly Trying: An Analysis of Context
Effects in Choice,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 9 (4),
189–200.
Dickert, Stephan, Daniel V€astfj€all, Janet Kleber, and Paul Slovic
(2015), “Scope Insensitivity: The Limits of Intuitive
Valuation of Human Lives in Public Policy,” Journal of
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 4 (3), 248–55.
Dunn, Elizabeth W. and Claire Ashton-James (2008), “On
Emotional Innumeracy: Predicted and Actual Affective
Responses to Grand-Scale Tragedies,” Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 44 (3), 692–8.
Evans, Jonathan S. B. T. and Keith E. Stanovich (2013), “Dual-
Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the
Debate,” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8 (3),
223–41.
Finucane, Melissa L., Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic, and Stephen M.
Johnson (2000), “The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks
and Benefits,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13
(1), 1–17.
Frederick, Shane (2005), “Cognitive Reflection and Decision
Making,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (4), 25–42.
Galak, Jeff, Joseph P. Redden, and Justin Kruger (2009), “Variety
Amnesia: Recalling Past Variety Can Accelerate Recovery
from Satiation,” Journal of Consumer Research, 36 (4),
575–84.
Gigerenzer, Gerd and Daniel G. Goldstein (1996), “Reasoning the
Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality,”
Psychological Review, 103 (4), 650–69.
Gneezy, Uri, Elizabeth A. Keenan, and Ayelet Gneezy (2014),
“Avoiding Overhead Aversion in Charity,” Science, 346
(6209), 632–5.
Hardie, Bruce G. S., Eric J. Johnson, and Peter S. Fader (1993),
“Modeling Loss Aversion and Reference Dependence Effects
on Brand Choice,” Marketing Science, 12 (4), 378–94.
Hasford, Jonathan, Adam Farmer, and Stacie F. Waites (2015),
“Thinking, Feeling, and Giving: The Effects of Scope and
Valuation on Consumer Donations,” International Journal of
Research in Marketing, 32 (4), 435–8.
Hauser, Marc D., Fritz Tsao, Patricia Garcia, and Elizabeth S.
Spelke (2003), “Evolutionary Foundations of Number:
Spontaneous Representation of Numerical Magnitudes by
Cotton-Top Tamarins,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of
London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 270 (1523), 1441–6.
Heath, Chip, Richard P. Larrick, and George Wu (1999), “Goals
as Reference Points,” Cognitive Psychology, 38 (1), 79–109.
Hossain, Mehdi T. and Ritesh Saini (2015), “Free Indulgences:
Enhanced Zero-Price Effect for Hedonic Options,”
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 32 (4),
457–60.
Hsee, Christopher K. and Yuval Rottenstreich (2004), “Music,
Pandas and Muggers: On the Affective Psychology of
Value,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133
(1), 23–30.
Hsee, Christopher K., Yuval Rottenstreich, and Zhixing Xiao
(2005), “When is More Better? On the Relationship between
Magnitude and Subjective Value,” Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 14 (5), 234–7.
Hsee, Christopher K., Fang Yu, Jiao Zhang, and Yan Zhang
(2003), “Medium Maximization,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 30 (1), 1–14.
Hsee, Christopher K. and Jiao Zhang (2010), “General
Evaluability Theory: An Analysis of When What We Care
about Matters,” Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5 (4),
343–55.
Huang, Szu-chi, Liyin Jin, and Ying Zhang (2017), “Step by Step:
Sub-Goals as a Source of Motivation,” Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 141 (July), 1–15.
Huang, Yunhui and Han Gong (2018), “The Minimal Deviation
Effect: Numbers Just above a Categorical Boundary Enhance
Consumer Desire,” Journal of Consumer Research, 45 (4),
775–91.
Huang, Zhongqiang, Xun Huang, and Yuwei Jiang (2018), “The
Impact of Death-Related Media Information on Consumer
Value Orientation and Scope Sensitivity,” Journal of
Marketing Research, 55 (3), 432–45.
Janiszewski, Chris, Tim Silk, and Alan D. J. Cooke (2003),
“Different Scales for Different Frames: The Role of
Subjective Scales and Experience in Explaining Attribute-
Framing Effects,” Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (3),
311–25.
Kahneman, Daniel and Shane Frederick. (2002),
“Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in






/jcr/article/47/4/566/5815984 by guest on 28 D
ecem
ber 2020
Intuitive Judgment,” in Heuristics and Biases: The
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale
Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 48–81.
Kivetz, Ran, Oded Netzer, and V. Srinivasan (2004), “Alternative
Models for Capturing the Compromise Effect,” Journal of
Marketing Research, 41 (3), 237–57.
Kivetz, Ran, Oleg Urminsky, and Yuhuang Zheng (2006), “The
Goal-Gradient Hypothesis Resurrected: Purchase
Acceleration, Illusionary Goal Progress, and Customer
Retention,” Journal of Marketing Research, 43 (1), 39–58.
Kruschke, John. (2014), Doing Bayesian Data Analysis: A
Tutorial with R, JAGS, and Stan, New York, NY: Academic
Press.
Kull, Alexander J. and Timothy B. Heath (2016), “You Decide,
We Donate: Strengthening Consumer–Brand Relationships
through Digitally Co-Created Social Responsibility,”
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 33 (1),
78–92.
Larrick, Richard P. and Jack B. Soll (2008), “The MPG Illusion,”
Science, 320 (5883), 1593–4.
Lee, Chang-Yuan, Carey K. Morewedge, Guy Hochman, and Dan
Ariely (2019), “Small Probabilistic Discounts Stimulate
Spending: Pain of Paying in Price Promotions,” Journal of
the Association for Consumer Research, 4 (2), 160–71.
Lipton, Jennifer S. and Elizabeth S. Spelke (2003), “Origins of
Number Sense: Large-Number Discrimination in Human
Infants,” Psychological Science, 14 (5), 396–401.
Liu, Peggy J., Kelly L. Haws, Cait Lamberton, Troy H. Campbell,
and Gavan J. Fitzsimons (2015), “Vice-Virtue Bundles,”
Management Science, 61 (1), 204–28.
Lynch, John G. Jr., Dipankar Chakravarti, and Anusree Mitra
(1991), “Contrast Effects in Consumer Judgments: Changes
in Mental Representations or in the Anchoring of Rating
Scale?,” Journal of Consumer Research, 18 (3), 284–97.
Mittal, Vikas, William T. Ross Jr., and Patrick M. Baldasare
(1998), “The Asymmetric Impact of Negative and Positive
Attribute-Level Performance on Overall Satisfaction and
Repurchase Intentions,” Journal of Marketing, 62 (1), 33–47.
Mukherjee, Kanchan (2010), “A Dual System Model of
Preferences under Risk (2010),” Psychological Review, 117
(1), 243–55.
Niedrich, Ronald W., Subhash Sharma, and Douglas H. Wedell
(2001), “Reference Price and Price Perceptions: A
Comparison of Alternative Models,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 28 (3), 339–54.
Niedrich, Ronald W., Danny Weathers, R. Carter Hill, and David
R. Bell (2009), “Specifying Price Judgments with Range-
Frequency Theory in Models of Brand Choice,” Journal of
Marketing Research, 46 (5), 693–702.
Oppenheimer, Daniel M., Tom Meyvis, and Nicolas Davidenko
(2009), “Instructional Manipulation Checks: Detecting
Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power,” Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 45 (4), 867–72.
Parducci, Allen (1963), “Range-Frequency Compromise in
Judgment,” Psychological Monographs: General and
Applied, 77 (2), 1–50.
——— (1965), “Category Judgment: A Range-Frequency Model,”
Psychological Review, 72 (6), 407–18.
Parducci, Allen and Douglas H. Wedell (1986), “The Category
Effect with Rating Scales: Number of Categories, Number of
Stimuli, and Method of Presentation,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 12 (4), 496–516.
Parkman, John M. (1971), “Temporal Aspects of Digit and Letter
Inequality Judgments,” Journal of Experimental Psychology,
91 (2), 191–205.
Patalano, Andrea L., Jason R. Saltiel, Laura Machlin, and Hilary
Barth (2015), “The Role of Numeracy and Approximate
Number System Acuity in Predicting Value and Probability
Distortion,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22 (6), 1820–9.
Payne, John W. (1976), “Task Complexity and Contingent
Processing in Decision Making: An Information Search and
Protocol Analysis,” Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 16 (2), 366–87.
Payne, John, James R. Bettman, and Eric J. Johnson (1988),
“Adaptive Strategy Selection in Decision Making,” Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 14 (3), 534–52.
———. (1993), The Adaptive Decision Maker, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Peters, Ellen M., Howard Kunreuther, Namika Sagara, Paul
Slovic, and Dan R. Schley (2012), “Protective Measures,
Personal Experience, and the Affective Psychology of Time,”
Risk Analysis, 32 (12), 2084–97.
Pham, Michel Tuan and Tamar Avnet (2009), “Contingent
Reliance on the Affect Heuristic as a Function of Regulatory
Focus,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 108 (2), 267–78.
Pham, Michel Tuan, Ali Faraji-Rad, Olivier Toubia, and Leonard
Lee (2015), “Affect as an Ordinal System of Utility
Assessment,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 131 (November), 81–94.
Pinel, Philippe, Manuela Piazza, Denis Le Bihan, and Stanislas
Dehaene (2004), “Distributed and Overlapping Cerebral
Representations of Number, Size, and Luminance during
Comparative Judgments,” Neuron, 41 (6), 983–93.
Ratner, Rebecca K., Barbara E. Kahn, and Daniel Kahneman
(1999), “Choosing Less-Preferred Experiences for the
Sake of Variety,” Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (1),
1–15.
Saini, Ritesh and Sweta C. Thota (2010), “The Psychological
Underpinnings of Relative Thinking in Price Comparisons,”
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20 (2), 185–92.
Schley, Dan R. and Ellen Peters (2014), “Assessing “Economic
Value” Symbolic-Number Mappings Predict Risky and
Riskless Valuations,” Psychological Science, 25 (3), 753–61.
Shah, Anuj K. and Daniel M. Oppenheimer (2008), “Heuristics
Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction Framework,”
Psychological Bulletin, 134 (2), 207–22.
Siegler, Robert S. and John E. Opfer (2003), “The Development of
Numerical Estimation: Evidence for Multiple
Representations of Numerical Quantity,” Psychological
Science, 14 (3), 237–50.
Simonson, Itamar (1989), “Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of
Attraction and Compromise Effects,” Journal of Consumer
Research, 16 (2), 158–74.
Sloman, Steven A. (1996), “The Empirical Case for Two Systems
of Reasoning,” Psychological Bulletin, 119 (1), 3–22.
Toplak, Maggie E., Richard F. West, and Keith E. Stanovich
(2011), “The Cognitive Reflection Test as a Predictor of
Performance on Heuristics-and-Biases Tasks,” Memory &
Cognition, 39 (7), 1275–89.






/jcr/article/47/4/566/5815984 by guest on 28 D
ecem
ber 2020
Tversky, Amos (1972), “Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of
Choice,” Psychological Review, 79 (4), 281–99.
Wernerfelt, Birger (1995), “A Rational Reconstruction of the
Compromise Effect,” Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (4),
627–33.
Wynn, Karen (1990), “Children’s Understanding of Counting,”
Cognition, 36 (2), 155–93.
Xu, Fei and Elizabeth S. Spelke (2000), “Large Number
Discrimination in 6-Month-Old Infants,” Cognition, 74 (1),
B1–11.
Xu, Fei (2003), “Numerosity Discrimination in Infants: Evidence
for Two Systems of Representations,” Cognition, 89 (1),
B15–25.






/jcr/article/47/4/566/5815984 by guest on 28 D
ecem
ber 2020
